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Abstract: Crump et al. define eight criteria indicating sentience in animals, with a focus on
pain. Here, we point out the risk of false negative or false positive diagnoses of pain. Criteria
of different levels of inclusivity are useful for using the precautionary principle in animal
welfare considerations, and for more formal scientific evidence of pain. We suggest tightening
the criteria -- from more general evidence of sentience to pain alone -- because crucial
evidence for animal welfare decisions might otherwise be missed for animals subjected to
invasive and injurious procedures.
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Introduction
Crump et al.’s criteria are useful and pragmatic in assessing the probability of an
animal’s sentience, and specifically the capacity for pain. We agree with Crump et al. that
positive evidence for sentience makes it at least probable that the animal is also able to feel
pain, to an extent where risk assessments for animal welfare need to be thoroughly
considered. However, it is important to distinguish these (self-professed) “inclusive” criteria,
that may raise the alarm bells of potential concerns for animal welfare, from strong scientific
evidence for pain in particular. Crump et al. sometimes use more general hallmarks of
sentience as potential indicators of pain (e.g. “integrative brain regions”). However, an animal
may be sentient without feeling pain. For example, humans with congenital insensitivity to
pain are clearly sentient (Nagasako et al. 2003). In this sense, the Crump et al. criteria may
induce some ‘false positive’ conclusions about pain, where animals are diagnosed as sentient
but actually may not feel pain. This risk does not invalidate the criteria, as part of a
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precautionary judgement, but a stronger verdict comes from direct assessments of whether
the animal can feel pain.
On the other hand, criteria that do not directly link to pain may induce false negatives.
For example, an animal might not show indicators of positive affective states, such as feeling
happiness, but still feel pain. For this reason, we caution against using only positive emotionlike states as indicators of sentience, and to extrapolate from these to the possibility that
animals feel pain (Andrews 2022; de Waal 2022; Souza Valente 2022). Although assessing
positive experiences can have important effects on improving animal welfare (Boissy et al.
2007), the risk of false negative diagnoses of pain is potentially more serious for welfare
considerations than false positives. A direct assessment of pain is therefore more valuable.
In what follows, we discuss those of Crump et al.’s criteria (a) where we feel that more
exclusive standards might be required for a formal diagnosis of pain experiences (although
we recognise the value of inclusivity in erring on the side of caution in considerations of
animal welfare). We also discuss (b) where a criterion needs moderate amendments, so as to
focus more stringently on pain.
1. Nociception
2. Sensory integration
3. Integrated nociception
4. Analgesia: (a) endogenous (b) exogenous
5. Motivational trade-offs
6. Flexible self-protection
7. Associative Learning
8. Analgesia preference: (a) self-administer (b) location (c) prioritised

Crump et al.’s 8 criteria

Criterion 2: Sensory integration in the brain
(a) The convergence of different sensory pathways is a common feature of brains; it
might not be indicative of sentience (or consciousness) generally, nor of pain specifically.
Thus, Criterion 2, as currently written, should only be taken as a tentative indicator of
sentience. Stronger formal evidence for sentience comes from psychological experiments
demonstrating multisensory cognitive operations on mental representations, as found, for
example, in bees (Giurfa et al. 2001; Lawson et al. 2018; Solvi et al. 2020).
(b) For a more rigorous pain criterion, we propose focusing strictly on the central
nervous integration of nociceptive processing with other sensory stimuli, perhaps in
combination with psychological evidence as outlined above
Criterion 4: Analgesia
(a) Criterion 4 is currently slightly too lenient for a solid indicator of pain experience.
Jablonka and Ginsburg (2022) argue that even non-sentient animals are likely to respond to
anaesthetics and analgesics. Indeed, local anaesthetics block nociception only and thus do
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not indicate any central pain processing (Walters 2022). However, analgesics that work in the
brain areas that process nociceptive stimuli would likely affect the subjective experience of
pain, as they do in humans (Ossipov et al. 2010).
(b) Following on (a), we argue that that the endogenous neurotransmitter system
should involve the brain, and that the analgesic should act in brain areas involved in the
processing of nociceptive stimuli. To further clarify: Acting ‘in a way consistent with pain’, in
this context, means a reduction in the response to a noxious stimulus, because this is how
endogenous nociceptive modulation systems and analgesics work to reduce pain.
Criterion 5: Motivational trade-offs
(a) As is, Criterion 5 is useful for a precautionary approach, but the definition may be
too inclusive for a formal diagnosis of pain experience, since a relatively simple trade-off can
fulfill the criterion. For example, the nematode Caenorhabditis elegans will cross an aversive
hyperosmotic barrier to reach a food odor (Ghosh et al. 2016). These two sensory inputs
interact via simple neural mechanisms without involving centralized integration (Ghosh et al.
2016, 2017; Irvine 2020; Shinkai et al. 2011).
(b) Stronger evidence for Criterion 5, and better evidence for pain, comes from a
demonstration that the trade-off is based on mental representations (e.g. memories) in the
brain. For example, in Gibbons et al. (2022), bumblebees make trade-offs between memories
of conditions associated with noxious and appetitive stimuli, and not those stimuli
themselves.
Criterion 6: Self-protective behaviour
(b) We suggest modifying the phrase ‘likely to involve representing the bodily
location of the noxious stimulus’. We recommend clarifying that this is achieved by directing
the behaviour specifically towards the site of noxious stimulation, such as grooming
behaviour or protection of an injured limb.
Criterion 7: Associative learning
(a) At its basic level, associative learning is mechanistically simple and does not require
the type of conscious awareness usually invoked in the phenomenon of pain. Thus, Criterion
7 may be too inclusive.
(b) As mentioned in Crump et al.’s target article, certain forms of associative learning,
such as trace conditioning, where in some cases the subject has to keep track of the passage
of time between the conditioned and unconditioned stimuli, appear to require conscious
awareness (Clark and Squire 1998; Clark et al. 2001; Clark and Squire 1999). This also appears
to be the case for some forms of reversal learning, where over multiple reversals an animal
appears to understand the rules of the reversal pattern. Where such paradigms incorporate
noxious stimuli, they might constitute strong evidence for pain experiences. We thus would
amend Criterion 7 to only include these types of nociceptive associative learning.
N.B. We also recommend removing the redundant note that habituation and
sensitisation do not fulfill Criterion 7, as these are by definition not associative learning.
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